China has made significant efforts to challenge the dominance of the U.S. dollar through two key initiatives: BRICS and the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS). However, neither has come close to accomplishing its goals.
BRICS, which includes Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, is still primarily a political coalition. Although it expanded to ten members in 2025, it has yet to establish itself as a real trade bloc. Recent discussions about a new reserve currency for BRICS have resulted in little progress. As India’s Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar pointedly noted, “India has never been for de-dollarization. Right now there is no proposal to have a BRICS currency.” Without common economic goals or the ability to issue a joint currency, BRICS remains more of an idea than a functional entity.
CIPS, which debuted in 2015 to facilitate renminbi (RMB) payments, aimed to create an alternative to the dollar-dominated system. Its membership numbers, around 1,280 institutions in 103 countries, are misleading. Many of these “members” are branches of Chinese banks or institutions tied to China’s interests, rather than genuine global participants. In practice, CIPS has not gained traction outside China’s influence; the yuan features in a minimal part of international transactions. The stark difference in transaction volume illustrates this disparity: CIPS processes only about $91 billion per day compared to the $1.8 trillion daily through CHIPS, the U.S. system.
Moreover, CIPS remains reliant on SWIFT, which handles the majority of its transactions. This dependency undermines any claim that CIPS can stand alone as a viable alternative. Its role is further diminished when considering that the renminbi constitutes a mere 2 to 3 percent of international payments. Rather than signifying a shift, the activity on CIPS largely reflects shifts in Chinese and Russian domestic policies rather than global usage.
Overall, both BRICS and CIPS exhibit China’s aspirations to alter the financial landscape. Yet, the obstacles they face—political discord among members, lack of infrastructure, and resistance to the yuan—project a bleak reality for China’s ambitions. As the Atlantic Council’s study revealed, the U.S. dollar remains entrenched as the world’s primary reserve currency. For now, these initiatives have yet to pose any real threat to the financial supremacy of the dollar.
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