China has been methodically bolstering its land-based missile capability with an eye toward Taiwan for decades. U.S. officials warn that this enhanced missile force could now jeopardize critical U.S. military assets across the Western Pacific, from airfields to ports. Analysts suggest that the land domain — often an overlooked aspect of military strategy — may very well tip the scales in the ongoing rivalry between the U.S. and China.
Experts emphasize that this competition hinges not on conventional troop movements but on missile ranges and the ability of U.S. forces to withstand initial assaults. “The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force… has built an increasing number of short-, medium-, and long-range missiles,” said Seth Jones from the Center for Strategic and International Studies. These missile systems can cover extensive regions, particularly across the “first and increasingly the second island chains,” challenging American military operations.
For years, the conventional wisdom among Chinese military planners was that they could not compete with U.S. air superiority in a direct engagement. As a result, they developed a workaround through an accumulation of land-based firepower aimed at neutralizing U.S. bases and keeping American forces at bay. “They didn’t think that they could gain air superiority in a straight-up air-to-air fight,” noted Eric Heginbotham of MIT. The outcome has been a massive inventory of theater-range missiles, supported by underground facilities and mobile launchers, all designed for rapid deployment.
While China carries a numerical advantage in missile systems, the U.S. retains significant benefits in other areas, particularly in targeting capabilities and survivability. American missile systems like Tomahawks and future hypersonics integrate into a sophisticated global surveillance network that China has yet to establish. “The Chinese have not fought a war since the 1970s,” Jones pointed out, highlighting gaps in their operational experience. The U.S. military has cultivated extensive skills through decades of combat, employing multi-domain task forces to coordinate cyber, air, and ground operations.
However, the U.S. also faces pressing challenges, particularly concerning missile stockpiles. “We still, right now… would run out (of long-range munitions) after roughly a week or so of conflict over, say, Taiwan,” Jones stated, underscoring a critical vulnerability. In response, Washington is ramping up production of ground-launched weapons. New systems, including Typhon launchers and high mobility artillery rocket systems, are part of a strategy to counter China’s missile-heavy approach by hitting back from greater distances.
China’s strategy appears built on the premise of overwhelming U.S. bases early in any conflict. Conversely, the U.S. plans to expand its layered air defenses significantly. Heginbotham indicated the necessity of diversifying missile defenses, noting, “We really need a lot more and greater variety of missile defenses.” U.S. submarines offer an advantage, as they can launch strikes from various locations in the Pacific while maintaining stealth, which the Chinese military currently lacks.
Command integration also remains a gap for China. While American forces routinely engage in coordinated operations, the Chinese military struggles with organization and decisiveness within its ranks. Events in the Pacific with allied nations like Japan, the Philippines, and Australia provide the U.S. with logistical support and intelligence-sharing advantages, essential for a comprehensive military strategy. This network of partnerships starkly contrasts with China’s limited regional presence.
In the event of a land conflict, the operational dynamics become clear. The efficacy of missile units will depend on their ability to fire, relocate, and return fire before they can be neutralized. China has invested significantly in measures enhancing missile survivability, such as distributing its forces across hardened sites and employing mobile launchers. Despite this, U.S. forces would be exposed to the challenges posed by Chinese surveillance and long-range attacks.
American military planners are recalibrating their strategies for this new reality, focusing on deception and mobility — essential qualities for surviving the opening stages of a missile war. Should the U.S. find itself drawn into a conflict over Taiwan, it must grapple with a difficult decision: whether to target Chinese missile bases on the mainland. Striking these positions could escalate tensions, while refraining from action may diminish operational efficiency. Heginbotham remarked, “Yes… you can defend Taiwan without striking bases inside China,” which points to the inherent complexity of modern military engagements.
Ultimately, the contest in the Pacific is defined by geography and the ability to project power from specific locations. Both the U.S. and China are navigating similar challenges, albeit from different vantage points. The ability to shoot, relocate, and sustain missile fire holds the key to controlling the land domain and shaping military outcomes in the region. This analysis underscores that this emerging landscape requires both strategic foresight and a readiness to adapt to fast-paced developments in military technology and strategy.
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