The Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) is a powerful Shia group, deeply linked to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Following the death of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on February 28, the IMN’s response was swift and widespread. Demonstrators took to the streets in cities such as Lagos, Abuja, and Kano, waving Iranian flags and carrying portraits of the late leader.
The IMN, founded in 1978 by Sheikh Ibrahim El-Zakzaky, has a long-standing relationship with Iran, rooted in Khomeinist ideology. The organization boasts around four million followers and operates throughout nearly all of Nigeria’s 36 states. Its headquarters, the Husainiyya Baqiyatullah in Zaria, Kaduna State, serves as a spiritual center steeped in the Iranian revolutionary tradition. After engaging with leaders during a trip to Iran in the 1980s, El-Zakzaky returned with a vision to instill that same religious ideology in northern Nigeria. For over four decades, the IMN has maintained its ideological ties with Tehran, bolstering its credibility within Nigeria’s Shia communities.
The reaction to Khamenei’s death was not limited to organized protests by the IMN. In Kano, members of the Qadiriyya Sufi order held a funeral prayer for the leader. The IMN is not a fringe group; it occupies a pivotal place in Nigeria’s religious landscape, particularly in northern Kaduna, which sits at a tense intersection of various religious communities. The area has seen conflict between predominantly Christian groups and jihadist organizations, making the IMN’s activities particularly significant in understanding the country’s security dynamics.
Despite the turmoil surrounding them, the IMN has seen limited violence compared to other groups in Nigeria. While clashes with security forces have occurred, attributed to their protests and activities, the IMN’s record does not yet include coordinated attacks on civilians. In 2019, the Nigerian government designated the organization a terrorist group, citing violent encounters with law enforcement. A notable confrontation in Abuja resulted in multiple fatalities, raising alarms among political leaders about the potential evolution of the IMN into a more dangerous entity, akin to Boko Haram.
The ideological divide between the IMN and other violent extremist groups in Nigeria is crucial. While organizations like Lakurawa and ISIS-affiliated groups pose a militant Sunni threat, the IMN embodies a distinct Shia perspective that aligns itself with Iran. These groups might share animosity toward Western influences and Israel, but their operational structures and foreign affiliations differ significantly.
In the wake of Khamenei’s killing, IMN leaders issued strong statements attributing blame to Western intervention. Zakzaky described the event as a blatant act of aggression from both the U.S. and Israel, suggesting it would ultimately unite and empower the Muslim community. This posture reflects a broader narrative fostered by Iran, aimed at framing regional conflicts through the lens of religious unity against perceived oppression.
Further complicating this landscape is the IMN’s annual observance of Quds Day—a day established by Khomeini in 1979, calling Muslims worldwide to support Palestine and highlight opposition to Zionism. The IMN utilizes Quds Day in Nigeria not only as a platform for religious expression but also as a means for mobilizing support against Western influences in the region.
The IRGC has been known to assist in establishing training facilities for IMN militants, further embedding Iranian influence in Nigeria. Analysts note this relationship may transform the IMN into a more militarized force, given Iran’s historical commitment to training foreign proxies. This partnership demonstrates Iran’s strategy to extend its ideological reach into West Africa, tapping into local dynamics while fostering a generational commitment to its cause.
Despite being banned, the IMN operates openly in various northern states and has successfully mobilized mass protests, showcasing its resilience amid alleged government suppression. The orchestration of large demonstrations, coupled with coordinated statements from leadership, highlights a robust organizational infrastructure that persists despite legal constraints.
The long-term implications of the IMN’s activities warrant serious attention. Experts suggest the group, bolstered by continued Iranian support, risks undergoing further radicalization, potentially sparking a Shia insurgency. The societal investment seen during recent protests indicates that Iran’s influence is not just an immediate concern but signals a sustained commitment to instilling its ideological framework deep within Nigerian society.
The demonstrations following Khamenei’s death, marked by the presence of young and old alike, underscore the continuation of ideological mobilization. Tehran’s investment in the IMN is likely to shape Nigeria’s religious and political landscape for years to come, with potential consequences extending far beyond its borders. As the IMN carves out its position in Nigeria, with Iran’s backing, it will remain a significant player in an already complex and volatile environment.
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