On May 26, 2023, a definitive sign of military cooperation emerged as Chinese and Lao troops completed a joint live-fire exercise in Laos. This event reflects not just an increase in regional military collaboration, but also adds context to a looming question: when will China move to invade Taiwan? Analysts increasingly believe it is not a matter of “if” but “when.” The intricacies of this potential conflict hinge on various strategic factors outlined by Dr. Gregory J. Moore, a noted scholar in government and defense studies.
Dr. Moore has distilled his analysis into 13 key factors that will influence Xi Jinping’s decision regarding an invasion of Taiwan, along with four persistent conditions that heighten this urgency. Among these 13 factors, two critical issues emerge that may delay any immediate actions: the readiness of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the state of China’s economy. Despite boasts of military strength, the PLA demonstrates gaps in training, logistics, and capabilities that need to be addressed. Furthermore, China’s economic woes, including youth unemployment surpassing 21% and a plummeting housing market, present substantial hurdles.
However, 11 out of the 13 factors suggest that an invasion could be imminent. These factors include Taiwan’s shifting national identity, which increasingly separates from mainland China, as evidenced by surveys showing only 3.6 percent of Taiwanese now identifying as Chinese. This deepening divergence reflects a critical psychological barrier for Beijing. Additionally, Taiwan’s semiconductor industry, particularly TSMC’s dominance, remains a valuable target for China. As production capabilities spread to places like Arizona, Germany, and Japan, the urgency for China to secure this asset only grows.
Military dynamics also tip the scale toward potential aggression. Currently, China holds an advantage with ship-killer hypersonic weapons such as the DF-17 system, while the U.S. appears unprepared to counter these capabilities effectively. Nevertheless, this advantage may not last as the U.S. accelerates its defense innovations. Despite the PLA’s current edge, assessments indicate that U.S. commitment to Taiwan is strengthening through arms sales and military support, further complicating Xi’s calculus of when to act.
The geopolitical atmosphere adds further weight to China’s decision-making process. As U.S.–China relations continue to deteriorate, the potential repercussions of an invasion may seem less daunting to Xi. The current climate elicits perceptions of American hostility, reinforced by Xi’s own descriptions of U.S. strategy as “comprehensive containment, encirclement, and suppression.” This perspective contributes to China’s urgency to reclaim Taiwan amid fears of future isolation.
Xi’s domestic political landscape is another critical facet. His aspirations for legacy cemented with a successful Taiwan reclamation align with upcoming important milestones, like the 2027 Party Congress. Recent victories by Taiwan’s pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party further diminish any hopes for reconciliation, steering the trajectory away from Beijing’s influence.
Moore’s analysis underscores that while military readiness might suggest a postponement, the other factors pointing toward immediate action present a complex challenge. The CCP’s longstanding ideology in favor of territorial integrity and its “sacred commitment” to Taiwan create immense pressure. Furthermore, Xi’s authoritarian leadership can foster a culture of misinformation within military ranks, where the PLA’s true readiness may not be disclosed honestly.
In summary, Dr. Moore speculates that an invasion timeline may fall within the next one to three years, with the most probable window closing before the 2027 Party Congress. Ignoring this analysis could leave the U.S. and its allies vulnerable to what could evolve into one of the most significant flashpoints in global politics.
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